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ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1974 - 1986
Symptoms of economic crisis - long run economic decline - are
now so widespread in South Africa that the existence of such a crisis is
increasingly taken for granted in public discussions of the state of the
economy and its possible improvement. Even the Governor of the Reserve
Bank, Dr Gerhard de Kock, now uses the "structural slowdown" (his label
for economic crisis) to fend off the charge that the primary
responsibility for economic decline, culminating in the foreign debt
debacle of August 1985, lies with the Banks' shift, in the years from
1979, to a fundamentally different policy orientation. He has recently
argued that "the structural slowdown of South Africa's real rate of
growth began roundabout 1974 and not in 1981." The drop from an annual
average growth rate of real GDP of 4,9% (1940 - 1974) to 1,9% (1974 -
1985) was, he argued, "mainly the result of a decline in the ratio of
exports to Gross Domestic Product and a weakening of the terms of trade
... [These and other] unfavourable exogenous developments since the
early seventies made drastic and painful adjustments in South Africa
unavoidable."
Radical social scientists had, of course already been arguing
for several years that there was an "organic" crisis, one not only in
the economy but more generally through the society. This has become an
entrenched part of (radical) conventional wisdom to the point that
analyses now frequently begin by simply asserting the fact of the
crisis, this then "framing" the examination of some or other aspects of
society. Yet, as Bill Freund has recently noted, this in fact
represents the reversal of the notion which had earlier been generally
accepted by radicals: that apartheid was, if not necessarily the best
possible shell for capital accumulation, certainly a very fruitful one.
From this view, radicals did not seriously consider the likelihood, or
even possibility, of economic crisis leading to the rejection of
apartheid by capitalists.
That this latter development has occured with increasing
frequency as the economic crisis has deepened in recent years has led,
not surprisingly, to the revival and refinement of the old liberal
argument that economic growth would (eventually, somehow) lead to the
end of apartheid. This, together with their own turnabout in position,
poses a challenge to radical analysis: to develop a substantial and
consistent analysis of capital accumulation which preserves their view
of the earlier relationship between apartheid and capitalism, explains
the transformation from long run apartheid boom to economic crisis, and
then analyses the crisis itself.
In this paper, I argue that a response to this challenge can
usefully begin with the theories of "capitalist regulation" and
"challenges to capitalist control" developed by some French and US
Marxists respectively, to analyse the contemporaneous economic crisis in
the advanced capitalist countries. After spelling out the basic
concepts of the approach, I use it to develop the broad outlines of an
analysis of the post-war boom and crisis in South Africa. The argument
remains somewhat schematic and often unsupported by sufficient
statistical data. My empirical research is still at an early stage.
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Conceptualising Boom and Crisis Phases in Capital Accumulation
The increased popularity of Marxist economic analysis from the
late sixties - in the context of the shift from boom to crisis -
produced three alternative theoretical explanations for the development
of an economic crisis, which was defined generally as a break in the
accumulation process involving a fall in the rate of profit.
The first approach saw itself as a return to Marxist orthodoxy.
It argued that capitalism has a tendency as a result of competition
towards increased mechanisation of production. This implied a rising
organic composition of capital (ratio of constant to variable capital or
dead to living labour). The resulting tendency to fall of the profit
rate could be offset for a time by one or more of the various
counteracting tendencies, but eventually, it was argued, the profit rate
must actually fall - capital will have been overaccumulated relative to
the rate of exploitation, producing a crisis. Criticisms of this view'
included, inter alia, that it focused too narrowly on both the sphere of
production and on the "logic" of capital accumulation, and that there
was inadequate analysis of exactly how and when the tendency would
overwhelm the counter-tendency.
The second perspective, basing itself on Marx's analysis of
changes in the size of the reserve army of labour, argued essentially
that crisis was the outcome of overaccumulation of capital relative to
supply of labour* As accumulation proceeded and more labour was
employed, the shrinking reserve army boosted workers• power in the
labour market. The rise in real wages achieved thereby squeezed the
profit share of value added, lowering the profit rate. This argument
was criticised in turn for concerning itself too narrowly with
distributional issues and ignoring production.
The third theory, underconsumptionism or more generally,
realisation failure, finds some support in Marx's own work but is also
clearly influenced by later Marxists (Luxemburg) and Keynes. The
essence of this view is that (the mass of) profits grows too quickly
relative to other sources of aggregate demand, wages in particular. Thus
total output cannot be absorbed by limited markets and the profit rate
must eventually fall, in the absence of exogenous sources of additional
demand.
Two problems can be raised common to all three theoretical
positions, as developed during the 1970s. Firstly, many writers drew no
clear distinction between the secular (long-run) tendencies of capital
accumulation and its cyclical fluctuations. Some writers used a theory
to analyse the longer term movement, while others applied the same
theory to cycles. Related to this, the implication in many long-run
analyses was that a crisis indicated insurmountable difficulties for
capitalism, a terminal disease. They could not account for capitalism's
mutability and continued surivival through several crises.
The other point is that the institutional context of
accumulation was generally ignored, so that capitalist social relations
and accumulation were presented as existing and developing abstractly,
in a vacuum, so to speak. It was not fully clear how crises, which
ultimately reflected the internal contradictions of capital produced a
resolution of these contradictions, thereby enabling the rate of
accumulation again to rise, as Marx had argued.
Debates over the various problems with these theories produced
the "regulation" and "challenges to capitalist control" approaches. My
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discussion of these theories below is based mainly
 ?on the former, but
freely uses ideas from the latter where appropriate.
To begin with, this perspective avoids with the general issues
raised above, by focusing on both the development of crisis and the
conditions for the renewal of capitalist accumulation. The underlying
perspective is that capital social relations ("class struggles") exist
not abstractly but within a variety of structures and institutional
forms (economic, social and political) which shape the way in which
these relations develop over time. Furthermore these relations are
historically specific and contingent: an economic crisis expresses
contradictions within (and between) these various forms of existence of
capitalist relations. Such contradictions can be resolved (and
generally have been) by transforming the specific structures and
relations, without changing the fundamental capitalist nature of the
social relations themselves. An economic crisis is thus seen more
appropriately as a turning point in the form of capitalism rather than
as a terminal disease. Its resolution is as likely or more so to
involve a transformation of capitalism as a transformation from
capitalism to a different mode of production.
Regulation theory clearly involves two distinct conceptual
levels of analysis of accumulation: its path, looking at the profit
rate and other key Marxist variables, and its institutional context. On
the first level, the central concept is the "regime of accumulation",
which represents a reproduction scheme over time. It describes the
interaction between transformations in the conditions of production
(changing technology and labour process) and transformation in the
conditions of realisation of the resulting output changes. The starting
point is thus the traditional Marxist view of the engine of capitalist
accumulation - the constant efforts of capitalists to cheapen costs
and obtain surplus profits, by increasing mechanisation. This is
measured by changes in labour productivity. But in summarising the
relationships between the rate of exploitation, organic composition and
rate of profit, the regime of accumulation also takes into account the
potential difficulties for the accumulation process posed by the levels
of aggregate demand (conditions of realisation) and of the real wage
(and thus the profit share). In other words, the regulation approach is
theoretically agnostic on the three positions outlined above - all can
be accommodated as tendencies produced by accumulation, both as initial
causes of crisis or as developing during the course of a crisis.
At the other level of analysis, the organising concept is the
"mode of regulation", although the American challenges to capitalist
control" group use the term "social structure of accumulation (SSA)",
perhaps a more congenial term. As already noted, this constitutes the
ensemble of social institutions, structures and implicit norms which
organises and canalises - "regulates" - the multi-faceted class,
intra-class and other group conflicts which together determine the path
of accumulation. The SSA, in other words, shapes the behaviour and
expectations of economic agents. Elements of the SSA relate to all
aspects of the accumulation process: the wage relation (in the labour
process and the labour market), the structure of demand, (including
particularly the "norms" of working class consumption, foreign trade and
the public sector), competitive interrelations between capitals, and the
financial system. Each of these four aspects is labelled a structural
form. The form of insertion into the world capitalist economy can be
seen as a specific structural form, though clearly different aspects of
this are relevant to the various structual forms mentioned.
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It should be recognised that the SSA notion has conceptual
limitations: it could "grow" to incorporate all aspects of society or
else "shrink" until its meaning evaporates. Clearly some judgement is
essential to differentiate the impact on accumulation of a range of
social processes; nevertheless the major features of the SSA or mode of
regulation can be identified reasonably specifically, by starting from
Marx's concept of the capital circuit, on which the SSA is clearly
based. Furthermore, the analytical use of the SSA does not necessarily
depend on an exhaustive spelling out of its every detail: it is a
macro-economic concept and more than the sum of its parts - the path
of accumulation is crucially related to its degree of internal
coherence.
These two central concepts are located within a historical time
framework which integrates the long-run and cyclical fluctuations of
accumulation. During a long-run boom, a "match" - dynamic or
metastable equilibrium - is achieved within the regime of accumulation,
the convergence of changes in production conditions and realisation
conditions being institutionalised by the SSA. Changes in the rate of
exploitation and the organic composition are such as to keep the rate of
profit from falling over the long-run. Cyclical fluctuations do occur -
this is not a neo-classical growth model. When a cyclical upswing leads
to too wide a divergence within the regime of accumulation, a downswing
will ensue.
Because the SSA is coherent, economic agents (including policy
makers) respond in a fairly predictable manner to the downswing so that
conditions for the resumption of social accumulation are fairly quickly
brought about. Thus the cyclical downswing during the boom can be seen
as a stabiliser, maintaining the high rate of accumulation, rather than
as an interruption or break reflecting serious contradictions. For this
reason, the business cycle during this accumulation phase is labelled
reproductive.
The crisis phase (the long-run decline in accumulation) is then
distinguished from the boom by a shift in the nature of the business
cycle from reproductive to non-reproductive. This allows crises to be
identified with some precision. They represent a lack of harmony -
disequilibrium - within the regime of accumulation, linked to a
breakdown of the coherence of the SSA, and a "malfunctioning" of some or
all of its constituent elements. Their consequence is slower
accumulation.
The actual shift from boom to crisis is a complex process.
Tendencies (a range of different possibilities exist) develop within the
accumulation process itself, putting pressure on some SSA institutions.
Inevitably one or more prove unequal to the changing situation, perhaps
because they have not adapted sufficiently to the effects of
accumulation on the relative size and strength of the social forces
whose interaction they are intended to regulate. The process then
becomes cumulative as economic agents try to counteract the ensuing
difficulties, in the process increasing pressure on other elements of
the SSA. The latter increasingly disintegrates, reinforcing the move to
a lower rate of accumulation.
A question which frequently arises is whether the crisis is
"caused" by factors internal or external to the national economy (see
for example, the quote from de Kock, above). In the regulation approach
there is a tension between the national and international dimensions of
accumulation. The SSA institutions stamp a clearly national character
on the accumulation process, but the latter is clearly also an element
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of accumulation in the capitalist world economy. Yet the complexity of
the process by which the crisis actually develops is such that the issue
of the "nationrigins" of the "causes" appears to be meaningless.
The non-reproductive nature of the cyclical downswing during
the crisis implies that conditions for rapid accumulation are no longer
"automatically" restored. This is reflected in the fact that variables
which moved in a given direction during the reproductive downswing,
thereby helping to restore accumulation, now move in the reverse
direction. This does not mean that there wil be no upswings, but these
are likely to be hesitant and short lived. A return to a sustained high
rate of accumulation - the resolution of the crisis - requires the
successful structuring of a new SSA.
Regulation theorists have used this framework to analyse the
rise and decline of the post war pattern of accumulation in the advanced
capitalist economies which they characterise as "Fordism". By this they
mean, firstly, that transformations in the labour process took the form
of the creation of production line methods, yielding substantial
improvements in productivity and increases in output. This process had
already begun during the 1920s, but had not then been matched by real
wage improvements, leading to the underconsumptionist-induced Depression
of the 1930s. After the war, although starting in the late 1930s in
some countries, a new SSA was "constructed", institutionalising mass
consumption. Elements of this were the spread of collective bargaining,
state provision of social security and a range of social services, and
easier access to various types of credit. Thus, mass production and
mass consumption were linked in a virtuous circle: productivity
improvements offset rises in both capital intensity and real wages, so
that the rate of profit was stabilised (in the long run) at a high
level. From the late 1960s this situation began to disintegrate, as the
rate of growth of labour productivity began to falter. The substantial
and continuing debate over the precise causes of this, and its process,
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
We need now to apply this theoretical framework to South
Africa, looking first at the post war "apartheid boom" and then at the
shift into the crisis.
"Racial Fordism"?
From the perspective of regulation theory, the post-war
combination of apartheid and import substitution industrialisation can
be seen as the defining characteristics of the SSA in a limited Fordist
scheme, which I call "racial Fordism", for want of a less clumsy label.
As with Fordism in the advanced countries, accumulation in South Africa
during this period involved the linking of the extension of mass
production with the extension of mass consumption, but in a manner that
was restricted on both sides of the equation, as is very familiar.
Mass productivity was extended on the basis of tariff-protected
import substitution, so that the proportion of output taken by consumer
durables and intermediate goods increased. The absence in general of
local production of capital equipment and reliance on imports meant that
capital-deepening (increased capital intensity) occurred primarily as
part of capital-widening (extending production capacity). More advanced
technologies were incorporated only into additions to capacity, with
existing equipment and technologies remaining in use. Thus the increase
in the capital-labour ratio was limited compared to the ACCs where
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implementation of new technologies generally involved scrapping of
existing equipment.
Capital equipment imports were "paid for" by the .domestic
production of raw material and precious metal exports linked to Fordist
growth in the advanced economies. Changing conditions of production
thus depended crucially on the terms of trade, the balance of payments
and the exchange rate, so that the regime of accumulation must be
understood to incorporate these variables. During the 1950s, mineral
output and productivity expanded far more rapidly than that of
manufacturing, which in turn made possible a reversal of this situation
during the 1960s.
The pattern of changing conditions of production fitted well
with the development of the wage relation on the basis of rigid
apartheid differentiation though this too represented a limitation of
racial Fordism as compared with the fully developed scheme. The
situation of the white working class was institutionalised along very
similar lines to those of the working classes of the Western economies:
an increased proportion of this group moving into skilled and
supervisory positions in the labour process, with steady rises in real
wages making possible the spread of mass consumption of housing and
locally produced consumer durables. Structures of collective bargaining
and a social welfare system and very favourable subsidy and credit
arrangements all underpinned this process. In this fashion,
underconsumption was made impossible while whites captured the lion's
share of overall production gains.
The African working class did obtain some portion of the
latter, however. As Doug Hindson has argued, this group became
increasingly differentiated as industrialisation produced a stratum of
semi-skilled permanently urbanised workers. Firms seeking surplus
profits tended to lower their unit labour costs by "floating the colour
bar" - substituting low wage black labour for high wage whites - when
they adopted new technologies.
Some share of the resulting productivity gain did accrue to
black workers whose real income did grow during the post war period,
although at a far slower rate than that of whites. The "conditions of
reproduction" of urban black labour were transformed in the post war
period, even though they were of course not incorporated into mass
consumption.
A full explication of the structures of "racial Fordism" would
have to spell out also the role of the extension of state productive
activity (providing jobs for whites as well as financial support and
cheap inputs for secondary industry) as well as the development of a
structure of capitalist competition and a financial system which
facilitated mining surpluses being channelled into industrial
investment. Here I turn instead to the time paths of the "inner
variables" of the regime of accumulation. A rough preliminary
estimate of these can be derived by examining growth rates of real
wages, labour productivity and the capital-output ratio.
What is striking here is the fact that during the post war
boom, accumulation in South Africa exhibited a similar interaction of
the long term growth trends of these variables as is found in the
advanced countries. The rise of the capital/labour ratio (the organic
composition of capital) was, as noted above, limited: less than 3% per
annum over the whole period, and slightly more than 3% during the 1960s
(Table 1). This produced a more or less equivalent rate of productivity
growth. Equally important, as we shall see below, was that the price
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level for imported capital equipment and intermediate goods also rose
slowly during the 1960s (Table 2). This was linked to productivity
improvement in the advanced countries. Changes in the capital-output
ratio in South Africa are determined by the combination of these two
effects, rather than simply being the product of the relationship
between rising capital intensity and productivity growth. The nature of
these trends meant that the capital-output ratio was stable over the
long run: there was sufficient offset to the effect of a rising
technical composition on the tendency of the profit rate to fall.
Looking now at the wage (or profit) share as a proxy for the
rate of exploitation, it appears that, in manufacturing, the share of
wages remained stable over the long run (at around 46%), while in mining
and commercial agriculture, the wage share actually fell during the
1960s. This suggests that the rate of exploitation in the economy as
a whole rose somewhat, pushing up also the rate of profit, given the
stable capital/output ratio.
Cyclical fluctuations persisted, however, though the downswings
were of rather short duration. Their reproductive character is
suggested by examining a (stylised) cycle. As the pace of investment
increased during the upswing, the growth rate of the capital/labour
ratio increased, so that eventually the capital output ratio also began
to rise. In other words, the cyclical upswing itself, starting with a
high or even rising profit rate, would induce downward pressure on
profitability. Reinforcement of such pressure stemmed from a rise in
unit labour costs, as the increase in capital utilisation and investment
also tightened the labour market for white, coloured and Indian workers
leading to rising real wages for these workers. ("Registered"
unemployment - covering these groups - was a sensitive index of the
business cycle.) The nature of the SSA was such, however, that the same
processes which led to downward pressure on profitability also produced
"bottlenecks" which determined the upper turning point of the business
cycle.
Firstly, the acceleration of final investment tightened the
foreign exchange constraint, notwithstanding the net capital inflow
which often occurred. This in turn led to tighter liquidity conditions
in the monetaary system, pushing up interest rates. During the 1960s
most fixed capital investment was financed by bank credit, so that the
rise in the cost of capital slowed the rate of investment.
Similarly, "skilled labour shortages" would develop near the
top of the cycle, the upward floating of the colour bar making
productivity improvements possible only with a lag. The consequence
here would be similarly to create a disincentive to invest.
The business cycle, then, had built-in stabilisers which moved
it into the downswing. The '"bottlenecks" would now be relaxed, leading
to an improvement in expected profitability. Foreign exchange reserves
rose as imports declined and the balance of payments deficit dropped.
Easier money conditions were restored. As production levels dropped,
registered unemployment began to rise, so that real unit labour costs
slowed. Eventually, a revival of accumulation developed. The
downswing, in other words, had had a reproductive character. The
product, labour, financial and foreign trade markets were structured in
such a way that movements in these markets interacted to restore the
conditions of accumulation. The effect of policy action was essentially
to "endorse" the changes already occurring in accumulation, and to
affect their precise timing.
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It is important to note here that the foreign exchange and
skilled labour bottlenecks served to maintain the long term growth
trend. By pushing the economy into a cyclical decline, they limited the
long term rise of the capital-labour and capital-output ratios, so
preventing a trend drop in profitability. This view is the converse of
the usually accepted one that these "bottlenecks" reflected structural
contradictions in the accumulation process, and limited economic growth
over the long run.
The Accumulation Crisis
As already noted, the crisis is distinguished from the long
wave boom by the shift from a reproductive to a non-reproductive
cyclical downswing. Such a shift can be seen in an examination of the
cyclical downswing beginning in South Africa in mid-1974. The key
variables to focus on are those which indicated the reproductive nature
of the downswing during the earlier phase: the fall in real unit labour
costs and the rise in foreign exchange reserves. For the cycle to be
regarded as non-reproductive, these should move in the opposite
direction during the downswing. This proved to be indeed the case,
during both the recession which lasted from September 1974 until the end
of 1977, and again during the recession of the 1980s which lasted from
the end of 1981 until early 1986.
Evidence of the developing crisis was already present in the
recession lasting through 1971 and most of 1972. During these years,
the real unit labour cost showed only a very small decline, while a
devaluation in late 1971 was necessary to protect the foreign reserves,
suggesting that this mechanism was becoming increasingly unreliable.
The next recession, triggered by the "oil shock" of late 1973,
indicated that the crisis proper had begun. Real unit labour costs
rose, as indicated in Table 2, by an average of nearly 2,7% per annum
between 1973 and 1977, even though "registered" unemployment more than
tripled during the period. This was obviously the consequence of rising
African real wage levels, reflecting the breakdown of the SSA.
Foreign exchange reserves also followed a "perverse" pattern,
continuing to decline (in US dollar terms) despite two devaluations of
the rand during 1975. Even in terms of the domestic currency, their
rise in late 1975 was both limited and temporary.
Similar developments can be traced in these variables during
the period after 1981, as is reflected in Tables 2 and 3. During both
periods, it should be noted, there were temporary and limited revivals
of economic activity, limited in each instance to some recovery in the
international gold price and thus, some improvement in the foreign
exchange reserves. The fact that neither revival could be consolidated
into a more developed upswing through an improvement in investment, is
highly suggestive of the non-reproductive nature of the preceding
cyclical decline. In both cases these temporary revivals only
compounded the depth of the subsequent continued decline. A further
indication of the non-reproductive nature of the downswings is the very
slow pace with which the upswing (when it finally occurred) developed
any endogenous momentum. Like the past year from mid-1986 to mid-1987,
1978 was "officially" a period of cyclical upswing, but the improvement
in the levels of business cycle indicators was minimal, and expectations
of the overall rate of growth were repeatedly revised downwards. The
poor state of business confidence, then as now, can be taken as an
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accurate index of the disintegration of the SSA: one of the central
implications of a stable and inherent SSA is its invigorating effect on
capitalists1 "animal spirits".
The crisis phase of capital accumulation can thus be defined
fairly precisely by the nature of the cyclical fluctuations which occur.
These fluctuations also provide a useful periodisation of the crisis.
This seems especially convenient in the South African case, where the
cycle (i.e. 1977) also marked the beginning of efforts to restructure
the SSA. The second cyclical downswing both indicated the failure of
these initial efforts, and also helped to ensure their failure. The
period around the lower turning point of the second cycle has in turn
seen the beginnings of efforts to develop a new approach to
restructuring the SSA. I will not develop here an analysis of the
course of the crisis on the basis of such a periodisation, though this
forms part of the larger project for which this paper presents the
initial ideas. I turn instead to look at the actual development of
crisis tendencies in the economy.
Crisis tendencies emerged in the South African economy from
about 1970, when the long-run trend variables - the change in labour
productivity, the capital-labour ratio and the capital-output ratio -
began to diverge from their previous time-paths. The growth of the
capital-labour ratio accelerated, while productivity growth began to
level off. The growing gap between these two rates of change was
reflected in an increasingly rapid rise in the capital-output ratio.
As was the case of the interaction of these variables during
the boom, the new pattern in South Africa was similar to that found in
the advanced economies, with the significant difference that the shift
there dated from approximately 1966, according to most analysts.
Whatever the precise reasons for the shift in the advanced economies,
the productivity slowdown there raised the unit value of output in those
economies, and slowly began to undermine the stability of their SSAs.
The consequences of the former impact was that the price level
of machinery imported into South Africa began to rise, from a low point
in 1968 (see Table 3) until 1970. The rise was limited, but from then
it accelerated, the compound growth rate of the price index being 10,8%
per annum between 1970 and 1974 (after which it accelerated even
further, to 19,7% per annum up to 1980). I would argue that this was
transmitting the effects of the developing international crisis to the
domestic economy.
The rising cost of capital equipment did not lead to a fall-off
in demand - the price elasticity of machinery imports is very low in
South Africa. But it did have two significant effects. The first was
financial - more funds had to be committed for the same investment
project. This had an immediate impact on the growth of depreciation
figures (see Table 4 ) . The rise in the rate of inflation, from an
average of 2,5% per annum during the 1960s to 8,1% during the first half
of the 1970s, (most of this before the oil "shock") partially reflected
this. This then had the further effect of forcing down the real
interest rate - the "real cost" of capital - which is seen as the cause
of rising capital intensity during the 1970s by conventional theorists.
The second important result of the higher cost of capital
equipment imports was a rise in the cost, (in terms of capital invested
per rand) of productivity improvements, a decline, in other words, of
the "marginal efficiency of investment", in value terms. This implies
the undermining of the underlying profitability of investment projects,
as reflected in the new pattern of relations between the trend
variables.
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The argument here, therefore, is that there was no autonomous decline in
labour productivity, but that it was induced by a fall in the
productivity "yield" of capital investment.
The effect of this process on the capital-labour and
capital-output ratios would have been reinforced by the substantial
increase in state infrastructural investment from the early 1970s -
public corporations' fixed capital stock rose at an annual rate of about
14% between 1970 and 1977 {compared with 9% during the previous decade).
For the private sector as a whole, the corresponding figure was constant
at 4,5% per annum in the two periods, but for private manufacturing
industry, the growth rate of the capital stock halved, i>om 9% to 4,5%,
as investment fell off during the downswing after 1974.
A second factor helping to produce the crisis by interacting
with the first was introduced into the South African economy by the
further disintegration of the Fordist regime in the advanced economies.
Growing problems in the international financial system, linked in part
to the productivity slowdown, finally destroyed the Bretton Woods system
of fixed exchange rates, which had been a crucial element of the SSA.
The immediate consequence of this for South Africa was that the prices
of its exports, most particularly gold but also other minerals, began to
fluctuate more widely than before. The balance of payments and the
foreign exchange constraint thus no longer exercised a stabilising
long-run effect through their role in cyclical fluctuations, and instead
became a destabilising (and unpredictable) factor. Under such
circumstances, underlying long-run decline was more likely to be
reinforced than counteracted.
This destabilising impact seems to apply as much to
improvements in export prices as to deteriorations. The capture of much
larger "rents" by South Africa following the rise in the gold price from
1979 resulted in a discrete jump in the growth rate during the next two
years, but also may have had effects which deepened the subsequent
recession, triggered of course by the fall in the gold price and
deflationary policies in the US. The acceleration of the capital-labour
ratio during this upswing reflected a significantly higher rate of
capital-deepening investment, lowering the age profile of the capital
stock. This may have produced a much larger decline in investment
levels consequent on the falling aggregate demand and capacity
utilisation from late 1981. A related indicator was the weaker
financial position of manufacturing and commercial companies in 1979-80,
compared with 1972-73, despite the improved nominal profitability during
the "gold boom". Increased financial demands imposed on companies by
the boom, after the earlier decline in underlying profitability, made
them more vulnerable to the subsequent recession, as indicated by the
massive rise in overall debt levels which occurred after 1981.
To return to the originating causes of the crisis, a third
process can be identified internal to South Africa, which was at least
in part a consequence of the first two, suggesting the cumulative nature
of the disintegration of the SSA. I refer here to the rise in black
wages beginning in 1973. There were two immediate causes. In
manufacturing, the wage strikes in Durban and elsewhere, explicitly in
response to rising inflation, reflected the growing inability of the
structures through which "racial Fordism" incorporated African workers
into the wage relation, to continue to perform their regulating
function. In the mining industry, African workers were granted wage
increases in the wake of the rise in the gold price from late 1971,
though it seems that this was not unconnected to labour unrest in other
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Table 1
% change
per annum
1961-70
1970-73
1973-77
Source:
labour
productivity
2.70
0.30
-2.37
Report of Study Group
capital-labour output-capital
ratio
3.15
4.95
3.48
ratio
0
-4.35
-5.74
on Industrial Development Strategy,
Table 2
% change
per annum
1966-70
1970-73
1973-77
1977-82
1981-84
Source:
labour
productivity
2.97
2.65
-0.14
4.11
-0.06
National Producti
real
wages
2.18
2.18
2.54
2.67
2.04
real unit
labour cost
-0.65
-0.65
2.68
-1.44
2.10
Table 14. Col. 2 - Col. 1 CC Col. 3.
Table 3
Import Price Index
All imports
Machinery imports
All imports
Machinery imports
(1964 =
1966
109
118
1974
168
184
100)
1967
107
114
1975
n.a.
n.a.
1968
103
111
1976
280
304
Source: SA Statistics, various issues, SITC
Table 4
Provision for depreciation
% change per annum
(current prices
1946-60 1960-70
1969
106
117
1977
316
359
1970
109
122
1978
362
445
1971
114
132
1979
434
487
classifications.
, replacement
1970-75
value)
1972
130
156
1980
520
541
1975-80
1973
142
170
Total 10.90 9.27 19.03 18.31
Private Sector 10.83 9.16 19.54 17.50
Source: SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, supplement, September 1981,
